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Abstract 
This essay examines three approaches in Chinese foreign 
and security policies at work in India‟s neighbourhood 
with the help of three brief case studies involving Nepal, 
Bhutan and Sri Lanka. The first looks at how China has 
engaged with Nepal through connectivity projects as part 
of the Belt and Road Initiative. The second case study 
looks at Chinese attention to Bhutan especially in the 
context of the Doklam conflict with Indian in mid-2017. 
The third and final case study describes Beijing‟s military 
diplomacy with Sri Lanka. These case studies provide an 
overview of the range of Chinese activities, approaches 
and interests in South Asia that New Delhi often has 
trouble appreciating or accepting. This article argues that 
accepting the reality of these Chinese approaches and 
understanding them are essential for India to rethink and 
reinvigorate its own neighbourhood policy. 
Keywords: Chinese Foreign Policy; South Asia; Infrastructure 
Development; Military Diplomacy; Propaganda 
1. Introduction 
The Chinese have embarked on a path to gaining influence in Asia 
that is radically different in its approach from the United States. 
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The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is its most prominent and 
widely-discussed expressions but there are other alternative 
approaches. One is the older, traditional means of political 
messaging and signalling through the Chinese media and 
diplomacy while another is a relatively recent but still older than 
the BRI approach of increasing military exchanges and ties with 
other countries. This article examines each of these approaches in 
Chinese foreign and security policies working in India‟s 
neighbourhood with the help of three brief case studies. The first 
looks at how China has engaged with Nepal through the 
connectivity projects under the rubric of the BRI. The second looks 
at how Bhutan has been approached by China in the wake of the 
Doklam conflict with Indian in mid-2017 while the third and final 
section looks at how Beijing has used military diplomacy with Sri 
Lanka to improve its standing in that country. While these case 
studies are by no means comprehensive, they do, nevertheless, 
provide a glimpse of the range of China‟s activities, approaches 
and interests in South Asia that India often has trouble appreciating 
or accepting. This article argues that accepting the reality of these 
approaches and understanding them is essential if India is to 
reinvigorate her approaches to neighbours in the region. 
1.1 Connectivity Cooperation: The Case of Nepal 
China and Nepal signed a transportation agreement in Kathmandu 
on 7 September 2018, which would allow Nepal to trade with four 
seaports and three dry ports in China - Tianjin, Shenzhen, 
Lianyungang, Zhanjiang and the dry ports of Lanzhou, Lhasa and 
Shigatse (Yuan & Li, 2018). This was the finalization of a transit 
transport agreement reached by Nepalese Prime Minister KP Oli 
during his visit to China in 2016 in his first tenure as Prime 
Minister. The significance of this development is that the visit and 
this agreement are directly linked to the Nepalese search for 
alternatives to Indian control over its economic lifelines in the wake 
of the 2015 Indian fuel blockade on Nepal during the first Oli 
tenure. Indeed, it could be argued that the fuel blockade has been a 
turning point for the worse in the history of India-Nepal relations 
and an opportunity now being exploited to the hilt by the Chinese 
gradually but substantially. 
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It is evident that the Chinese-led BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) is 
going to be the framework for China-Nepal connectivity projects 
and cooperation (China Tibet News, September 8, 2018). Nepal is 
laying much in store in the planned increased connectivity with 
China via port, road, railway, aviation and communications 
networks under the „overarching framework of trans-Himalayan 
Multi-Dimensional Connectivity Network‟ (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Nepal, 2018). In addition to the proposed China-Nepal 
railway line between Xigaze and Kathmandu expected to be 
completed by 2022, Chinese analysts are also highlighting the 
Sichuan-Tibet railway, which is expected to boost both Tibet‟s 
connectivity with the rest of China and integration with South Asia 
by increasing the flow of both commodities as well as of tourists to 
Nepal (and to India) (Li, 2018). Nepal‟s fledgeling aviation sector is 
also depending on buying Chinese aircraft to increase capacity and 
routes served (Xinhua, January 31, 2018). In January 2018, China 
Telecom Group Corporation and the Nepalese Ministry for 
Information and Communication inaugurated the Nepal-China 
cross-border optical fibre link in Kathmandu, providing an 
alternate Internet gateway to the Himalayan nation in addition to 
those through India (Yuan, 2018). 
In May 2017, TAR and Nepalese enterprises signed two 
cooperation projects – the Sino-Nepalese Friendship Industrial Park 
and the China Tibet Autonomous Region-Nepal Cultural Industry 
Park (Wang, 2018). Chinese involvement in Nepal‟s energy sector is 
also growing. In addition to hydel projects, China is also helping 
the renewable energy sector in Nepal, for instance, through the 
donation of 32,000 sets of household solar power generation 
systems in January 2018 (Xinhua a, January 21, 2018). Among other 
developments in China-Nepal relations are agreements for the 
reconstruction of the building of the Consulate General of Nepal in 
Lhasa and the reconstruction of the Zhangmu Friendship Bridge 
and the Jijiang Thermal Cable Bridge (Wang, 2018). 
The Speaker of the Nepalese lower house of Parliament, Krishna 
Bahadur Mahara, attended the 4th China Tibet Tourism Culture 
International Expo, co-sponsored by the Ministry of Culture and 
Tourism and the TAR government in 2018. One of the objectives of 
the Expo was to “build an important channel for opening up to 
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South Asia”(China Tibet News, September 8, 2018). Mahara for his 
part said, “Tibet has become an important gateway for bilateral 
exchanges between Nepal and China in the field of trade, tourism, 
culture and other fields. Nepal attaches great importance to this 
Expo and hopes to promote business and tourism development 
between the two countries” (China Tibet News, September 8, 2018). 
Despite the efforts that India‟s Narendra Modi government has put 
into the relationship with Nepal since KP Oli returned to power as 
Prime Minister of Nepal – there have been multiple high-level 
visits – the legacy of India‟s fuel blockade of Nepal in 2015 appears 
difficult to overcome. While bilateral agreements continue to be 
signed, Sino-Nepalese interactions are now perhaps of equal if not 
more significance for Nepalese politicians.  
The Oli government also reversed the decision of its predecessor to 
cancel the award of the Buddhi Gandaki hydroelectric project to 
China. It must be remembered that it was on the eve of the general 
elections that in November 2017, that the then Nepalese Deputy 
Prime Minister and Energy Minister Kamal Thapa had announced 
the cancellation of the project saying that the agreement with the 
Chinese company was „marred by irregularities‟ and therefore, 
rejected by a parliamentary committee (Thapa, 2017).The Oli plan 
to reverse this decision had been in the works even before the 
government was sworn in (Zheng, 2017). Later, in a speech on the 
BRI in September this year, Oli said he „would like to dispel 
apprehensions, if any, by stating that the Government will be solely 
guided by the national interest in selecting or accepting projects 
and programmes under any bilateral, regional or multilateral 
mechanisms‟ (Government of Nepal, 2018). 
From the Chinese perspective meanwhile, at the signing of the 
aforementioned transportation agreement in Nepal, one of their 
interlocutors stated, „the agreement reached between China and 
Nepal shows that China has the ability and means to promote 
interoperability with South Asia. On the other hand, it also has a 
demonstration effect for the countries in the region, especially 
small and medium-sized countries‟ (Yuan & Li, 2018). This is 
clearly signalling to India that Beijing would not respect the 
former‟s sphere of influence in South Asia. 
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It is also significant that at the 4th China Tibet Tourism Culture 
International Expo, Linzhi was one of the venues (China Tibet 
News, September 11, 2018). Linzhi is one of the two prefecture-
level cities in the TAR that claims administrative jurisdiction over 
parts of Arunachal Pradesh. The Expo also saw the organization of 
the first “Himalayan Belt and Road” Cooperation Forum among 
other activities (China Tibet News, September 11, 2018), a 
formulation that is designed in a manner to draw objections from 
the Indians given their opposition to BRI itself. 
The aforementioned Oli speech deserves closer attention.  The 
speech was made at an international conference on the BRI in 
Tribhuvan University in September 2018 and titled, „Opportunities 
and Implications for Nepal and the Region‟ (Government of Nepal, 
2018). In it, Prime Minister Oli appeared to lay out his position 
more openly in favour of the Chinese initiative that India has 
bitterly opposed. 
One, he used the CPC template of calling the BRI „a visionary 
initiative launched ... by Chinese President Xi Jinping‟ – note the 
reference to the individual rather than the country. He also picked 
out pet themes from the lexicon of the BRI referring to „community 
of common interest‟ and „community of common destiny‟. Like any 
leader of a small nation under pressure from its other neighbours 
or on a difficult political wicket personally, Oli appeared to choose 
a personalised approach to China and to Xi.  
Two, he talked of the BRI as “an important step that aims at 
promoting connectivity and cooperation among the countries in the 
region and beyond”, implicitly ignoring both India‟s sovereignty 
concerns with respect to the CPEC as well as its concerns over 
transparency, accountability and any number of other issues over 
with the BRI as a whole. Besides praising Chinese rapid economic 
growth and highlighting how it could serve as a model for Nepal, 
Oli specifically stated that the “BRI can also be instrumental in 
implementing the Sustainable Development Goals. This way, it will 
serve the global goods in the interest of humanity” (Government of 
Nepal, 2018). However, the data now becoming available about the 
BRI five years since its launch suggests exactly the opposite and Oli 
and his advisers must have been aware of this. Looking to China as 
a model for economic development for Nepal is not an uncommon 
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theme among Nepalese leaders. For instance, former Nepalese 
Deputy Prime Minister Sujata Koirala, a leader from the opposition 
Nepali Congress, would say at another seminar in Kathmandu 
organised earlier in January 2018, that “China has achieved 
astounding economic growth while at the same it has reduced the 
poverty rate significantly in recent years. These positive 
transformations in China are exemplary especially for other least 
developed and smaller countries like Nepal” (Xinhua b, January 21, 
2018). 
Three, Oli buttressed the international narrative the Chinese are 
seeking to promote in opposition to the United States, saying 
“increasing protectionist tendencies are eroding the rule-based 
multilateral trading system” and that “BRI can be an option for 
openness and shared benefits” (Government of Nepal, 2018). In 
this, he was simply copying the Chinese code for the Donald 
Trump administration‟s apparent protectionist turn and trade war 
against China and the belief that it was the BRI that was next game 
in town. 
While Oli did devote some time in his speech to Nepal‟s building 
up of connectivity with India and referred to SAARC and 
BIMSTEC as important platforms for “multidimensional regional 
connectivity‟, he also reiterated the need to „make these regional 
organizations fully functional and result-oriented” (Government of 
Nepal, 2018). In other words, he reminded the audience of their 
failure thus far, which might be a fair enough assessment given the 
number of years these organisations have been in existence without 
much result. At the same time, Oli was also imbalanced in terms of 
his approach given that he did not find anything to criticise in the 
BRI when there was evidence aplenty even from his own 
neighbourhood of debt-traps and parting with strategic equity as a 
result of BRI projects, if not yet in Nepal‟s own case. 
2. Political Messaging: The Case of Bhutan 
The role of political messaging and persuasion in China‟s 
diplomacy generally and in South Asia more specifically should 
not be discounted for it both offers indicators or signals of as well 
as reflects Chinese approaches and thinking on a host of issues.  
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Just under a year after the Doklam standoff in Bhutan between 
India and China ended, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister, Kong 
Xuanyou, became the highest-ranking Chinese official yet to visit 
Bhutan when he landed in Thimphu on 22 July 2018. Officials from 
the Chinese embassy in Delhi have, however, frequented Bhutan 
earlier and it is noteworthy that the former Chinese ambassador to 
India Luo Zhaohui had visited Thimphu as early as January 2017 as 
had his wife, also a member of the staff at the Embassy (Roy, 2018). 
The visit by Kong, whose position is the Chinese equivalent to 
India‟s Foreign Secretary, should be seen as part of a logical series 
of Chinese steps preceding and following Doklam. In fact, it could 
well be argued that this expansion of China‟s relationship with 
Bhutan was precisely the objective behind the Chinese 
provocations at Doklam. For why else, would any thinking Chinese 
general put his troops in a tactically disadvantageous position in 
which there was only going to be one side coming out successful, 
namely India? Note also that the Chinese chose the one area of their 
dispute with Bhutan that also involved Indian interests. The 
objective could have been to make it appear – at least to the outside 
world if not to the Bhutanese themselves – that the Chinese were 
not forcing matters with Bhutan itself but were being set upon by 
the Indians. Following Doklam, China could legitimately claim its 
security interests were at stake and that it had to have a presence in 
and engagement with Bhutan. Former Indian NSA, Shivshankar 
Menon appeared to hint as much in an interview saying „I think a 
lot of [Doklam] was designed actually for its effect on Bhutan‟ (The 
Print, 2018). 
Perhaps, Indians military strategists have carried on for too long, 
under the mistaken impression, in the age of nuclear weapons and 
precision munitions, high-quality surveillance and sustained 
propaganda, that the ability to sever the Chicken‟s Neck corridor 
remains a significant objective of war for the Chinese. It might be 
important but it is not significant. The record should show that 
visual or physical access to the Corridor is not the only way to 
ensure India‟s Northeast remains politically fragile and 
strategically unstable in a manner that serves China‟s interests.  
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The elements of political persuasion employed by the Chinese vis-
à-vis the India-Bhutan relationship can also be gleaned from their 
media coverage of the tiny Himalayan country. 
In general, Chinese articles on Bhutan are of two kinds. The first 
that deal with the bilateral situation also take frequent direct or 
oblique potshots at India‟s apparently hegemonic role in the 
country. This probably picked up during the Doklam standoff with 
one Global Times editorial openly suggesting „China should lead 
the international community in restoring Bhutan‟s diplomatic and 
defense sovereignty‟ (Global Times a, 2017) while the People‟s 
Daily included articles with such bellicose titles as, „India must not 
flirt with disaster‟ and „India is playing with fire, and it could get 
burned‟ (Stone, 2013). 
During his visit, Kong made it a point to state that China respected 
Bhutan's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and 
that his country attached great importance to the „traditional 
friendship‟ with Bhutan. These points were repeated by a Chinese 
analyst of India, Hu Zhiyong, who then added that „So far Bhutan 
cannot completely get rid of India's influence on politics, economy, 
diplomacy and security‟ (Xu, 2018). 
An op-ed from March in the same publication was dismissive of 
the chances of success of India‟s neighbourhood diplomacy focused 
on Bhutan, again quoting the aforementioned Hu (Zhang, 2018). 
Other articles have tried to push the line India‟s neighbours, 
including Bhutan, are unhappy with India‟s apparent „sense of 
superiority‟ (Huang, 2018), and that India „stop treating those small 
countries around it as its mistresses and showing no tolerance 
when they interact with other major powers‟ (Global Times b, 
2017), while sometimes trying to take the edge off by referring to 
India‟s and China‟s shared history of suffering from colonialism 
and suggesting „India should strike sincere friendship with China 
and abandon the mentality that Beijing is its biggest rival‟(Cheng, 
2018). This last might only be a grudging acknowledgement of 
India‟s historical advantages in the region even if its smaller 
neighbours did not always like it. 
Chinese media also carries a fair number of references to Bhutan‟s 
bilateral ties with other countries besides India, perhaps as a way of 
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bringing the tiny Himalayan nation to both domestic attention and 
international attention as an entity out of India‟s orbit (Xinhua, 
April 17, 2017). 
Another set of articles focus on Bhutan‟s social and development 
experience with articles covering, for instance, environmental 
issues (Xinhua c January 29; Xinhua May 10, June 4, 2018). One 
article, for instance, talks about the apparent increasing popularity 
of WeChat in Bhutan used for both personal communications and 
commercial purposes (Xinhua, February 2, 2018). This, in turn, 
should concern Indian policymakers, who along with those from 
liberal democracies elsewhere are beginning to see the extent of the 
challenge posed by China‟s dominance in telecom and 
communications technologies. The controversy over the links of the 
Chinese telecom major Huawei and its linkages and potential 
subservience to the Chinese state is a case in point that highlights 
China‟s threats to information security, accuracy and even, access 
in other countries. 
Overall, Chinese media attention to Bhutan remains sporadic but 
how India reacts to Chinese moves might well determine the 
direction and trends of this attention. 
3. Military Diplomacy: The Case of Sri Lanka 
Increased military exchanges and diplomacy is another key feature 
of China‟s engagement in South Asia.  
In 2018, China announced the gifting of a naval frigate to Sri Lanka. 
This comes in addition to other elements of military engagement 
such as various Chinese training courses for all three services in the 
Sri Lankan armed forces and a Chinese-funded auditorium 
complex at the Sri Lanka Military Academy (Rutnam, 2018). The 
announcement came at a reception held in Colombo to mark the 
91st anniversary of the founding of the PLA and is once again part 
of the signature Xi style – while China has decided to ameliorate 
criticism of its BRI by the gift of money, it is also simultaneously 
declaring that it will not rein in its ambitions or lay low even for a 
time in the security aspects of its outreach to Sri Lanka, South Asia, 
or the world.  
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In other words, the sensitivity of such military deals is precisely 
how China signals that no matter the bad press or its own situation 
at home, it will push back against any power that chooses to 
believe China can and should be boxed in geographically or 
politically. And it clearly does believe that India‟s ambition to seek 
the hegemony of the Indian Ocean is very clear (Sina Military, 
April 18, 2018). Of course, it is also convenient that in this 
particular case, India while the dominant power in South Asia 
cannot similarly push back against China in the latter‟s sphere of 
influence in East Asia. 
The gift of a naval frigate is significant for the Sri Lankan navy does 
not currently operate a frigate. Frigates are generally designed for 
protection duties while accompanying other warships and 
merchant ships, including especially hunting submarines. It is, 
therefore, conceivable, that as part of expanding Sino-Sri Lankan 
military cooperation, Chinese-supplied frigates of the Sri Lankan 
Navy will accompany Chinese naval convoys or participate in 
Chinese anti-piracy missions. Additionally, the business of training 
Sri Lankan sailors for handling the new acquisition will increase 
Chinese military presence in Sri Lanka and the Indian Ocean.  
There is a still subtler Chinese military approach to Sri Lanka in the 
form of educational and training exchanges and research 
collaborations. A case in point is the setting up of the China-Sri 
Lanka Joint Centre for Education and Research (CSL-CER) at the 
University of Ruhuna in southern Sri Lanka. The centre is the result 
of an MoU between the two countries signed during Chinese 
President Xi Jinping‟s visit to Sri Lanka in September 2014. The 
point to note is that the Chinese partner for the collaboration is the 
South China Sea Institute of Oceanology (SCSIO) of the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences (Xinhua, September 29, 2018). 
On the surface, the activities of the SCSIO appear entirely above 
board in the form of academic staff and student exchange and the 
establishment of a fully-automated weather station, and a joint 
observatory for wave and tidal measurements. However, SCSIO 
has a much bigger role in Chinese security policies than is 
immediately apparent from its English-language website. The 
Chinese language website shows that it is engaged in „national 
defense safety construction projects‟ including the massive Chinese 
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reclamation projects on disputed features in the South China Sea in 
both the Paracels and Spratlys. The SCSIO, in fact, highlights the 
praise for its work from China‟s government, the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central 
Military Commission in 2018. That such an organization should 
have a presence – to fulfill China‟s desire to play „a bigger role in 
the international cooperation on marine sciences and education in 
the Indian Ocean region‟ as the Xinhua reports (September 29, 
2018) – has wider implications for India (Jacob, 2019). 
In many ways, the military outreach to Sri Lanka forms part of a 
very methodical approach of the Chinese. Note for instance, that 
Sino-Pak naval cooperation is already of long-standing and covers 
India‟s Arabian Sea flank. With China selling submarines and 
frigates to the Bangladeshi navy (Sina Military, June 14, 2018), this 
then covers India‟s eastern flank in the Bay of Bengal. And support 
to the Sri Lankan navy helps complete the arc by covering India‟s 
southern maritime expanse. Beijing has created with limited assets 
and without overt belligerence, a threat profile for itself vis-à-vis 
India that will only keep expanding even as India finds moves to 
deter this Chinese naval expansion difficult.  
This is for at least two reasons. One, militarily obviously, India 
cannot seek to equip its neighbours beyond a point both because of 
its lack of resources and suitable platforms to offer and for fear of 
these same assets being used against it or complicating other 
regional equations. Two, the political approach to persuading its 
neighbours to desist from buying or accepting Chinese military 
equipment is a necessarily long and slow process that cannot be 
achieved without India offering something else in return. In effect, 
Beijing has upped the costs for India‟s engagement in South Asia. 
4. Conclusion 
It is important for India‟s policymakers – its politicians, but its 
mandarins, especially – to let go of the sense of angst or resentment 
about losing India‟s traditional upper hand in South Asia to the 
Chinese. India‟s „upper hand‟ or traditional advantages in South 
Asia had in many respects caused it to become arrogant and 
inattentive to changes in the politics and societies of its neighbours 
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or to believe that these could be handled without too much effort. 
In the process, India left large gaps in its policymaking and 
outreach to its neighbours that the Chinese have exploited with 
speed and substantive measures, from infrastructure development 
to cultivating politicians of both the ruling and opposition parties 
to establishing direct linkages with ordinary people through public 
diplomacy, the offer of fully-funded delegation visits and/or 
scholarships or fellowships to journalists, scientists, students, 
artistes to military exchanges and diplomacy. Together, these 
initiatives have helped change attitudes to China from hostility or 
indifference to more positive views that see China‟s presence in 
South Asia as not just a matter of compulsion but also inevitable 
and natural. 
If the Indian strategic community were to accept the reality, 
however, that China has something to contribute from economic 
development to technology, even if it comes under BRI framework 
and rid themselves of their resentment, they would also be able to 
come up with better approaches to resolving problems in India‟s 
bilateral relationships in South Asia as well as identify other gaps 
and anticipate new problems in ties. A more flexible and generous 
approach to its South Asian neighbours would also allow India to 
then raise the stakes and better persuade them to avoid more 
sensitive engagements or entanglements with China in the military 
sphere.  
In essence, it is important for Indian policymakers – and its wider 
strategic community – to see Chinese presence in South Asia as an 
opportunity for India to refashion, reformulate and reimagine its 
approaches to foreign policy and national security involving its 
neighbours. 
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